In this paper, we present the results of a simple, easily replicable, survey study based on lottery bonds. It is aimed at testing whether agents make investment decisions according to expected utility, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky-Kahneman, 1992) or optimal expectations theory (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005, Brunnermeier et al., 2007) when they face skewed distributions of returns. We show that more than 56% of the 245 participants obey optimal expectations theory. They choose a distribution of payoffs which is dominated for second-order stochastic dominance and which would not be chosen according to cumulative prospect theory, for a large range of parameter values.
I Introduction
Standard economic theory assumes relatively simple rules to describe human behavior.
Agents are supposed to manage any quantity of information they receive, according to Bayes' rule, and to take decisions without emotions or distorted beliefs. Their objective is to maximize the expectation of their utility function (henceforth EU model). There is now some evidence that agents make systematic "errors", especially in assessing probabilities. The probability of very good outcomes tends to be overvalued (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; Buehler et al., 1994; Weinstein, 1980) , introducing an optimistic bias. The consequence is a suboptimal allocation of wealth. For example, households' portfolios are not well diversified. A part of their wealth is invested in mutual funds (and then well diversified) but another part, in general non negligible, is concentrated on a few stocks (Calvet et al., 2007 , Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008 , Mitton and Vorkink, 2007 , Polkovnichenko, 2005 . Moreover, portfolios are often biased toward lottery-type stocks with positive skewness. Barberis and Huang (2008) , Bali et al.(2009) , Kumar (2009) and Mitton and Vorkink (2007) recently published papers focused on that problem. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that stocks with positively skewed returns can be overpriced on markets populated by investors obeying cumulative prospect theory (CPT in the following). It is especially the case if the return on skewed securities is independent of the returns on other securities and if the supply of skewed stocks is small relative to the global market supply. Kumar (2009) shows the existence of significant links between investment behavior and lottery play behavior. He shows that investors used to play (unfair) state-lotteries also prefer lottery-like stocks. This observation is reinforced during economic downturns. Bali et al. (2009) show that stocks exhibiting at least one very high return in the past month are overpriced. This effect is robust when controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. Mitton and Vorkink (2007) analyze the behavior of more than 60,000 retail investors and show that those who are not diversified select a few highly skewed stocks.
It then seems that gambling and investment behaviors cannot be disentangled because of the preference for skewness and/or the attractiveness of the best outcome. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Brunnermeier et al. (2007) developed a theory of optimal expectations (OET in the following) to take into account this optimistic bias. In the second paper, Brunnermeier et al. (2007) consider a simple one-period, two-dates model; they assume that agents behave optimally given their beliefs, and choose portfolios maximizing the expected present value of future utility flows. Roughly speaking, the felicity of agents is composed of ex ante and ex post utility. Ex ante, it is optimal to distort beliefs in an optimistic way. However, this distortion comes at a cost, lying in a sub-optimal portfolio choice and a lower ex post expected utility. The authors call "optimal beliefs" the subjective assessment of probabilities which maximizes an average of ex ante and ex post utilities. In a complete market framework with a finite number of states of nature, they show that the optimal portfolio contains the risk-free asset, and the most skewed asset. Concerning optimal beliefs, they prove that the probability of only one state is overvalued, the probabilities of the other states being undervalued.
In cumulative prospect theory, distortion of beliefs is linked to payoffs, only through the ranking of gains and losses. Consequently, in a finite state space, the outcomes of two comonotonic prospects are weighted identically and independently of the values of the outcomes; only ranking matters. Concerning the distortions of beliefs, our results show that a large proportion of agents not only take into account the ranking, but also the values of the outcomes, especially the largest one.
In this paper, we present a survey study to test whether the attractiveness of the best outcome is really an important component of the decision making process or if agents behave according to the EU or CPT models. The test is based on a questionnaire asking participants to choose among different random outcomes of lottery bonds. These securities are well suited to address the question we are dealing with. First, they exist in many countries for more than two centuries, and are, even today, very popular (Green and Rydqwist, 1997 , Guillen and Tschoegl, 2002 , Lévy-Ullmann, 1896 , Millar and Gentry, 1980 , Pfiffelmann and Roger, 2005 , Ridge and Young, 1998 , Tufano, 2008 . Second, contrary to the distribution of stock returns which is unknown, the distribution of lottery bond returns is, in general, perfectly known. The possible outcomes are given objective probabilities. Third, most people who never invested in lottery bonds easily understand how payoffs are defined because they bet, at least occasionally, on state lotteries like the lotto game 2 .
We consider two designs for the lottery bonds. They differ by the way the amount distributed through the lottery is defined. The first bond is designed to study the decision making process and to answer our main question concerning the choice of EU, CPT or OET. The individual amount received by winners through the lottery is known in advance and the remaining amount to be shared among all subscribers (including the winners) is random. The second bond is aimed at controlling for the "minimum" required level of rationality, that is, the compliance to the first-order stochastic dominance principle. In this case, the global amount paid through the lottery is known in advance (but the individual gain is random due to a parimutuel feature). The remaining amount shared by all subscribers is then not random. In fact, as we cannot define an incentive compatible payment scheme for the participants (without assuming that one theory is better than the others), the questions related to this second bond allow to "select" respondents that provide answers compatible with first-order stochastic dominance.
Our results show that more than 55% of participants behave like OET investors, exhibiting a preference for the random payoff with the highest possible outcome. It is important to notice that the possible random payoffs of our first bond have the same expected value and that the variance of returns is the highest for the payoff with the largest outcome. Moreover, our design is such that the payoff including the highest possible outcome is dominated by all other choices in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. It then reinforces our result in favor of OET.
Our analysis also provides two by-products. The first one concerns the random choice of numbers. We illustrate that, at the aggregate level, people do not choose numbers at random, even when they are expected to do so 3 . This result is in line with most studies on state lotteries. These papers show that the distribution of numbers actually chosen by players is not uniform (see, for example, Farrell et al., 2000, Roger and Broihanne, 2007, among others) because they use common heuristics to select numbers.
The second side-result is linked to the assumption that rationality is common knowledge (Aumann, 1976) . It is a strong assumption and many examples show that it does not represent the way people are thinking. The most famous example is the beauty contest (first introduced by J.M. Keynes, 1936, chapter 12, p. 156 4 ) , translated by H. Moulin (1986) in numerical terms. Players have to choose a number between 0 and 100 and the winner is the one who chooses the number closest to a given percentage (say a) of the mean choice of players. The 3 For example, Boland and Pawitan (1999) show that people have difficulties to choose numbers randomly, even in very simple tasks. 4 As stated by John Maynard Keynes (1936) : "Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees." Nash equilibrium of the game is that everybody chooses 0 when a < 1 5 . However, all experiments show that most people are far from choosing 0 (Thaler, 1998 , Nagel, 1995 . Our results also confirm that a non negligible percentage of participants have a poor opinion about the rationality of others.
To sum up, we test three assumptions in this paper:
1) When facing positively skewed distributions, investors do not behave like risk averse expected utility maximizers. In particular, they do not use a mean-variance criterion.
Positive skewness is a highly weighted decision criterion and, more precisely, the probability of the highest possible outcome is overvalued.
2) People are not choosing numbers at random even when they are expected to do so.
They have common preferred numbers, a sub-optimal characteristic in a pari-mutuel game.
3) When the distribution of payoffs depends on the decision of others, agents have a tendency to consider that other people are not fully rational (and they seem right!).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the two lottery bonds used in the survey study. This section is written in such a way that the reader can think about his/her possible answers and can "participate" to the survey. Section III presents the theoretical analysis of the bonds and explains what theoretical choices should be, according to the three theories under examination. Section IV presents the empirical results and section V concludes.
II Design of the lottery bonds
Lottery bonds are in general fixed-rate bonds (with coupon rate r) issued by a state or a firm.
However, r applies to the global issue, not to the individual subscribers. If N one-year bonds are issued, each with a $1 face value, the issuer repays B = (1+r)N at the maturity date. A part of this amount is redistributed by means of a lottery. For example, B is divided in two parts such that B = B 1 +B 2 . n < N bonds are drawn at random and their holders share B 1 (equally or not, depending on the design of the lottery). The remaining amount, B 2 , is then shared equally among the N subscribers, or among the N -n losers.
In most cases, the issuer bears no risk since it repays B whatever happens in the random draw.
The risk is entirely borne by subscribers. Lottery bonds are then unusual financial assets since issuers voluntarily introduce randomness in payoffs.
In the two following subsections, we describe and characterize the two lottery bonds used in the survey study. The two bonds differ only by the way the amount paid through the lottery is defined. In the second subsection, we formalize the payoffs and introduce the notations used in the theoretical analysis of section 3.
II-1 Description of the lottery bonds
The two bonds are designed as follows.
A bank issues N (equal to 1,000,000 in the questionnaire) units of a lottery bond, each bond being sold $1. The subscriber of one bond has to choose a number between 1 and 10. At the maturity date, the bank pays an interest rate r (5% in the questionnaire) on the global amount issued, then repaying (1+r)N ($1,050,000) . However, the bank first draws one number at random between 1 and 10, say j (we say that series j has been drawn).
The two bonds differ in the way gains of winning subscribers are defined.
-For the first bond, the issuer pays $1 to each of the subscribers of series j and shares equally the remaining amount among all subscribers, including the winning ones. For example, if r = 5%, N = 1,000 and if 150 subscribers have chosen the winning series, they will receive $1.90. After having paid the winners $1 each, the bank shares the remaining $900 among the 1,000 subscribers, each one receiving $0.9.
-The second bond follows different rules. 10% of the initial amount issued is devoted to winners, the remaining being shared among all subscribers, including the winning ones. With the same data as before, a winner would receive $100/150 + $0.95 because the 150 winners have to share $100. The remaining amount is constant because the global amount won through the lottery is independent of the number of winners.
Consequently, all losing series receive $0.95, whatever the number of winners is.
The main question addressed in this paper is to know how people choose a series when they get information about choices of former subscribers. Table 1 shows the individual payoffs received by subscribers of the first lottery bond, depending on the series they invested in and on the series which has been drawn. In this example, the number of bonds is 1,000,000 and the interest rate paid by the bank is 5 %, so the bank repays $1,050,000 at the maturity date.
The first line indicates the number of subscribers in each series and the first column identifies the possible states of nature (the series number drawn at random by the issuer). When number 2 is drawn, the series-1 subscriber receives $0.9 because there were 150,000 subscribers in series 2. The remaining amount is $900,000 shared by the 1,000,000
subscribers. The same calculations justify the other amounts in the table. The "seriesk" column contains the payoffs received at the maturity date by a subscriber of series k when the number drawn at random is the one appearing in the first column and the same line.
Series1 Series2 Series3 Series4 Series5 Series6 Series7 Series8 Series9 Series10 100000 150000 80000 120000 60000 140000 70000 50000 130000 100000 1 1. Table 2 shows the individual payoffs received by the subscribers of the second lottery bond, depending on the series they invested in and on the series which has been drawn. Table 2 is built as table 1, the number of subscribers in each series and the coupon rate being the same.
For example, 1.95 is the final payoff obtained by a series-1 subscriber if series 1 is drawn. As there are 100,000 subscribers in this series, each of them first receives $1 ($100,000 shared by 100,000 winners) and the remaining $950 000 are shared equally among all the participants.
Each losing subscriber then receives $0.95. It explains the amounts appearing in the corresponding line. When a different number is drawn, the series-1 subscriber receives $0.95, because the remaining amount is still $950 000, shared among the 1,000,000 subscribers. The essential difference between the two bonds is that the payoff received by a "losing-series" doesn't depend on the losing number, all losers receiving $0.95. In other words, each bond 2 is characterized by only two possible payoffs, a winning one or a losing one. Only the winning amount is linked to the number of subscribers in the corresponding series. The "seriesk" column contains the payoffs received at the maturity date by a subscriber of series k when the number drawn at random is the one appearing in the first column and the same line.
Series1 Series2 Series3 Series4 Series5 Series6 Series7 Series8 Series9 Series10 100000 150000 80000 120000 60000 140000 70000 50000 130000 100000 1 
II-2 Formal presentation of payoffs
The payoffs of bond 1 can be formalized as follows. X is defined by:
Denote Z the random variable defined on the ten states of nature by:
where ( 
III Theoretical analysis

III-1 Lottery bond 1
We remarked before that if the numbers j N are unknown, the potential subscribers should be indifferent between series. What is changed when the information about the distribution θ becomes available? The following proposition shows that, if the distribution of frequencies is given, the expected return on bond 1 remains equal across series.
Proposition 1
1) The expected payoff of an investment in any series of bond 1 is equal to 1+r.
2) The variance of series-i return, conditional on a distribution 
⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ the expected payoff received by a subscriber of series i, conditional on a given distribution D.
The first moment is independent of frequencies and is then not a criterion for a rational investor to decide.
2) Using result of point (1), we can write
. We then get:
The last term of the second equality,
Point 2 of proposition 1 shows that a mean-variance investor would choose to "play with the crowd", a not so intuitive result. But, if we consider the case where all subscribers choose the same number, the issue becomes a risk-free asset, paying 1 + r, whatever the number drawn by the bank. It explains why playing with the crowd is variance reducing.
Expected utility maximization
Consider now the general case of a risk-averse investor and denote U her utility function, assumed strictly increasing and strictly concave. The following proposition generalizes the preceding results and shows that this investor always chooses the most popular number, that is the one for which N i is maximum.
Proposition 2
Let U denote a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function. If N i < N j then
Assume without loss of generality that the values of Z are ranked in increasing order, corresponding to a ranking of the i N in decreasing order. We know that ( ) 
Optimal expectations
According to optimal expectations theory, described here in a one-period framework with a finite number of states (Brunnemeier et al., 2007) , agents maximize the following expectation: portfolio consists to invest a part of wealth in the risk-free asset and the remaining amount in one and only one of the most skewed securities. In our choice context, the prices of all series are equal, the probabilities are equal and there is no aggregate risk. Therefore, the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities are identical. According to this two-fund separation result, agents should choose number 8 which is the most positively skewed portfolio. It also corresponds to the lowest i N . Figure 1 illustrates the non monotonic link between the skewness of payoffs and the number of subscribers using the data of table 1. It appears that series 8 is the most positively skewed series. As we saw that variance is also higher for series 8, choosing this series means a strong preference for skewness and illustrates the attractiveness of the highest outcome. 
Cumulative prospect theory
Suppose now that agents obey CPT. They maximize a value function, depending on gains and losses, calculated with respect to a reference point. Two natural choices are available for the reference point; the initial price of the bond, or the initial price capitalized at rate r. The latter is often used when prospect theory is applied to financial decisions (see, for example, Barberis et al., 2001) . The two reference points lead to the same results for the problem at hand, simply because all series payoffs include 9 possible losses and 1 possible gain, whatever the reference point is. In CPT, gains and losses are loaded by decision weights, obtained by distorting the cumulative (or decumulative) distribution function of payoffs. The weighting function w is defined by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as: The difference between the two series comes from the two highest payoffs which are (1;1.99) for series 5 and (0.99; 2) for series 8. The third line gives the decision weights for 0.65
The ratio of weights for the two highest payoffs is around 1.7. It is then an incentive to choose series 8 with the highest payoff. However, two other variables are important in the choice.
The loss aversion coefficient, equal to 2.25 in the is much larger than the absolute value of the decrease between 0.95 and 0.94. The consequence is that a CPT agent would prefer series 5 instead of series 8 for a large range of parameters. Moreover, if α is decreased, then increasing the curvature of the value function, the optimal CPT choice goes to a series with a larger number of subscribers. If the loss aversion coefficient is decreased, the result is unchanged (the optimal choice is not series 8)
as long as loss aversion stays above 1.2, an unusual value in experimental studies. Figure 2 shows the CPT evaluation of the 10 series with the initial parameters. Using a weighting function only based on the distortion of cumulative distribution functions, as in the rankdependent expected utility model, induces a weight of 0.25 for the gain which favors series n°8. However, it is not enough to compensate loss aversion and the effect of decreasing marginal utility. Series 5 with 60000 subscribers is the optimal choice in this case, as long as the loss aversion coefficient is greater than 1.72. To summarize the analysis, using the data of However, in state lotteries, the probability of winning is very low, giving a more important role to the distortion of beliefs. Here, the objective probability of the winning state is only multiplied by 1.7. It is not enough to make the choice of the most skewed alternative optimal.
III-2 Lottery bond 2
The analysis of bond 2 is much more simple. We saw in equation (3) 
⎠ more than series j with probability 0.1. It is as if you were given for free a lottery ticket paying this amount with probability 0.1.
Whatever your preferences are (obeying first order stochastic dominance), you accept the lottery ticket. Bond 2 is used to introduce a screening process in the survey study. Due to the problem addressed in the paper, there is no incentive compatible payment scheme because we have no a priori about which choice is the "right" one for bond 1. However, we can suspect that the answers of participants which do not obey first-order stochastic dominance are highly questionable. Simply, some students may not be motivated by the exercise. They then answer at random. The empirical section is then focused on participants having provided answers compatible with first order stochastic dominance. Nevertheless, we provide in the appendix the table of answers for the complete sample.
III-3 Rationality as common knowledge
Assume now that you have to choose a series to invest in bond 2, after one million other subscribers. You also know that one more million subscribers will choose after you, with updated information about sales. If rationality is common knowledge, it is not difficult to see that the equilibrium sharing of bonds at the end of the process should be an equal sharing across series. In fact, for bond 2, it is always optimal to choose the series with the lowest frequency when you are the last subscriber. It implies that, as long as the frequency of a given series is lower than 200,000, you can choose this series. The following rational subscribers will stop choosing a given series when the frequency will reach 200,000. Beyond this threshold, this choice becomes sub-optimal because there is at least another series with a lower number of subscribers. Consequently, if you believe that rationality is common knowledge, you can choose at random if the current sharing of bonds is the one given in table 1 or 2.
For bond 1, the story is a little bit different. If you think that others are like you, you should choose the same answer to questions 3 and 5 if you are a risk-averse expected utility maximize, assuming that the following subscribers will also bet with the crowd. The optimal choice if you obey OET is, as for bond 2, to invest at random, assuming the others also obey OET. Obviously, if you consider that a proportion of agents is risk-averse, you will never choose the highest frequency series, anticipating that it will be chosen by these expected utility maximizers.
III-4 The random choice of numbers
Finally assume that you have no information about the sharing of bonds across former subscribers. You are only told the way the bank will reimburse the issue. In this case, the probability distribution of returns is equal in each series, either for bond 1 or for bond 2. Your choice then should be random in the set of ten series. Therefore, the distribution of choices at the aggregate level should be uniform. We show in the next section that it is not the case.
IV The survey study
IV-1 The questionnaire
The study was realized during different finance courses in two French universities (University The participants had to answer 6 questions, divided into three groups of 2 questions, related to the lottery bonds presented in the preceding section. In each pair of questions, the first one is related to bond 1 and the second to bond 2. The required answers were simply numbers between 1 and 10 corresponding to the choice of a series number.
For the first two questions, participants were only told the characteristics of the bonds, without any other information, either on the As mentioned before, with no information other than the way payoffs are defined, investors should be indifferent between the series; we then expect a random choice for the two first questions.
After having answered the two first questions, participants received the information summarized in table 5 (it corresponds to the first line of tables 1 and 2). It was provided on a slide, so all participants knew that everybody was receiving the same information. For questions 3 and 4, it was specified that the respondent was about to buy the last bond of the issue. In other words, everybody was able to infer the final distribution of payoffs. Series1 Series2 Series3 Series4 Series5 100 000 150 000 80 000 120 000 60 000 Series6 Series7 Series8 Series9 Series10 140 000 70 000 50 000 130 000 100 000
Quantities already bought in each series
A slight modification was introduced for the students at university of Clermont-Ferrand. They were shown table 5 for questions related to bond 1 (questions 3 and 5) and table A2 (see the appendix) for questions 4 and 6. In table A2, the quantities of bonds are the same but the numbers associated with these quantities are different. We then deal with the same set of cumulative distributions of returns but the number identifying a given distribution is not the same. The idea was to control for a possibility of "inertia" in the answers. We saw, in the preceding section, that the rational answer for question 4 is series n°8 but, it is also the answer to question 3 for agents obeying optimal expectations theory. Consequently, we had to check if some students were choosing the same number to answer the two questions, simply by applying a law of least effort. In fact, nobody in the subsample (96 students) chose (8, 8) to
answer questions 3 and 4. There is then no reason to think that it is different for the other subsamples. In the subsample of 96 students, the rational answer to question 4 was n°4. We then also checked whether some students could have been considered rational "by inertia", that is by selecting the same answer for questions 3 and 4. More precisely, we counted the number of students having chosen the same number for questions 3 and 4, whatever this number was. Only 3 students made such a choice over the subsample of 96 students.
Consequently, the results presented in the following cannot be invalidated with this argument.
In the third sequence of two questions (questions 5 and 6), the rule was that participants had to choose a series number with the same information as in questions 3 and 4, but they were told that one million bonds were still to be sold to other subscribers after their own choice.
Moreover, participants were also informed that the future subscribers would get updated information about sales at the time of their own purchase. Therefore, participants had to build expectations about the decision rules of future subscribers. These two last questions are devoted to analyze the opinion of participants about the rationality of others, as in the usual beauty contest.
To present the results concerning questions 3 to 6 in a simple way, we use the numbering of series in table 5 for all the subsamples. Obviously, for questions 1 and 2, participants were not shown table 5 or table A2 , so we keep the numbers they used to answer.
IV-2 Results
IV-2-1 Attractiveness of the best outcome
As mentioned before, the data provided in table 5 imply that agents obeying first-order stochastic dominance must choose series n°8 at question 4. 245 students over 337 made this choice. They are called "rational" in the following even if "wrong" answers to this question can simply be due to a lack of motivation to participate. Table 6 shows the percentage of rational answers in each training program. The lower percentage in Clermont-Ferrand is possibly due to the more complicated task students had to manage with different data for bonds 1 and 2. Apart from this, the results are difficult to interpret these differences, taking into account the number of students in each subsample. Table 7 Panel A: Answers of « rational » participants
The figures are provided in percentage but the number of answers in each column varies from 241 and 244 (a few students left some questions unanswered). The answers for Q4 are not provided because, by construction, all "rational" respondents chose series n°8 for this question (except those in Clermont-Ferrand for which the rational answer was n°4). 
BONDS
IV-2-2 Opinions about the rationality of others
Questions 5 and 6 were designed as questions 3 and 4, except that participants were told that one million bonds were still to be sold after their own choice, the next subscribers choosing with updated information about sales.
As mentioned in the preceding section, concerning Q6, if participants were thinking that other subscribers are rational they should be indifferent between all solutions. We then expect a uniform distribution of choice. However, assuming that other subscribers are not completely rational, and have a "one-step" reasoning, leads you to play with the crowd, expecting that the others will stay in the low frequency series. In the same way, with a two-step reasoning, you should stay in the low frequency series. Figure 3 shows that answers to question 6 corresponds to agents mainly using a one or two-step reasoning. 141 participants (58%) chose numbers 2 or 8 corresponding to the two highest frequencies. Obviously, the uniform distribution hypothesis is rejected at conventional levels. ) 9 is essentially due to the participants using a one-step or a two-step reasoning. They account for more than 75% of the 2 χ value. 9 To calculate the 2 χ statistic, we grouped the two series with 120,000 and 130,000 subscribers due to the low frequencies of these series.
If we compare now the answers at questions 3 and 6 ( To sum up, it appears that the choices of participants do not confirm the assumption that rationality is common knowledge. The most frequent answers correspond to a one-step or two-step reasoning. This result is indeed not surprising since it is the most common values found in the literature for the depth of reasoning 10 .
IV-2-3 Heuristics in random choice of numbers
We expect random choices to questions 1 and 2 because participants have no information about choices of former subscribers. Figure 4 shows the bar chart cumulating choices for these two questions. In case of a uniform distribution, we should have frequencies around proportion is 13% in a set of 10 draws, the minimum and maximum proportions being 12.16% and 13.79%.
The main difference between the results of the lotto game and ours concern number 1.
However, this difference can possibly be justified by the fact that participants, considering all choices as equivalent, select number 1 which is obviously the first in the list of possible choices. In some sense, selecting number 1 could be interpreted as a random choice. But even if we share these answers between the ten numbers, the difference with a uniform distribution remains significant. The column "Mean" gives the proportion of players having chosen the number in the first column over the number of draws in the fifth column. "Min" and "Max" are the corresponding minimum and maximum proportion over the same number of draws.
Number Mean Min Max
Number of draws Standard deviation 1 7,85% 7,36% 9,29% 17 0,56% 2 8,29% 7,77% 9,40% 14 0,38% 3 11,30% 10,76% 11,68% 18 0,22% 4 10,67% 9,72% 11,28% 20 0,35% 5 13,00% 12,16% 13,79% 10 0,51% 6 10,20% 9,82% 10,77% 14 0,27% 7 16,53% 15,75% 17,10% 14 0,37% 8 10,27% 9,92% 10,75% 17 0,22% 9 9,41% 8,94% 9,86% 15 0,22% 10 6,46% 5,98% 6,94% 16 0,26%
V Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the way people manage a simple financial decision making problem based on lottery bonds. Our purpose was to compare three theories, expected utility, cumulative prospect theory, and the more recent optimal expectations theory. The latter implies that agents are especially attracted by the best outcome and overvalue its probability of occurrence. To distinguish between skewness seeking and attractiveness of the best outcomes we designed a lottery bond in such a way that all choices generate positively skewed distributions. We show that more than 55% of participants to the survey select the choice with the highest outcome, controlling for the expected return. Moreover, this choice is dominated by all other choices when expected utility is used as the decision making tool. Our results show that gambling and investing cannot be treated separately, an idea that appeared in several recent papers. These results are then consistent with the theoretical analysis of Brunnemeier et al. (2007) and with the empirical study of Bali et al. (2009) .
We also showed that people use heuristics to choose numbers at random, leading to non random choices at the aggregate level. Numbers 7 and 5 are especially popular and it comes with no surprise 13 . Finally, by introducing a kind of beauty contest in the questionnaire, we observed that respondents do not assume that rationality is common knowledge, either because they recognize their own limited rationality or because they consider that other are not fully rational. The questions used in this paper are very simple and make the study easily replicable. We then hope that it will be replicated on other populations with different cultural backgrounds to test if our results can be generalized to alternative environments.
APPENDIX: Questionnaire
BOND n°1
A bank (called bank1) issues 1,000,000 one-year bonds at a price of 1 € each. The bank repays 1,050,000 € at the end of the year (a 5% interest rate on the issue). When buying one bond, subscribers choose an integer number between 1 and 10. On the repayment date, the bank draws at random a (lucky) number between 1 and 10 and first repays 1 € to each subscriber having chosen the lucky number. The remaining amount is equally shared among all subscribers, including the winning ones.
Q1: Suppose that you buy one bond, which number do you choose?
BOND n°2
A bank (called bank2) issues 1,000,000 one-year bonds at a price of 1 € each. The bank repays 1,050,000 € at the end of the year (a 5% interest rate on the issue). When buying one bond, subscribers choose an integer number between 1 and 10. On the repayment date, the bank draws at random a (lucky) number between 1 and 10 and first shares equally 100,000 € among subscribers having chosen the lucky number. The remaining amount is equally shared among all subscribers, including the winning ones.
Q2: Suppose that you buy one bond, which number do you choose?
The table on the screen gives the number of bonds already sold for each choice of the lucky number.
Q3:
If you are about to buy the last bond issued by bank 1, which number do you choose?
Q4:
If you are about to buy the last bond issued by bank 2, which number do you choose?
Q5: Assume now that 2,000,000 bonds were issued by bank 1. If you buy a bond, knowing that 1,000,000 more bonds will still be sold after your choice (the next subscribers being fully informed about the evolution of choices by the updating of the table on the screen), which number do you choose?
Q6: Assume now that 2,000,000 bonds were issued by bank 2. If you buy a bond, knowing that 1,000,000 more bonds will still be sold after your choice (the next subscribers being fully informed about the evolution of choices by the updating of the table on the screen), which number do you choose? Table A1 Table shown (on a Powerpoint slide) to the participants after they answered questions 1 and 2 Series1 Series2 Series3 Series4 Series5 100 000 150 000 80 000 120 000 60 000 Series6 Series7 Series8 Series9 Series10 140 000 70 000 50 000 130 000 100 000
Quantities already bought in each series Series1 Series2 Series3 Series4 Series5 140 000 70 000 130 000 50 000 100 000 Series6 Series7 Series8 Series9 Series10 100 000 120 000 80 000 150 000 60 000
Quantities already bought
